Modelling the medium- to long-term potential

macroeconomic impact of Brexit on Ireland by Bergin, Adele et al.
The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn, 2017, pp. 305-316
Abstract: There is almost a complete consensus in the international literature that Brexit will have a
negative effect on the UK economy both in the short and long run. The UK is one of Ireland’s closest
economic partners and little is known about the potential macroeconomic impact that Brexit could have
on the Irish economy. In this paper, we use the new COre Structural MOdel of the Irish economy
(COSMO) to attempt to quantify the medium- to long-run impact of Brexit on the Irish economy under
a series of alternative scenarios. These scenarios are intended to cover a range of potential agreements
between the UK and the EU. We find that the level of Irish output is permanently below what it otherwise
would have been in the absence of Brexit.
I INTRODUCTION 
On 23 June 2016 the UK electorate voted to leave the EU. While the referendumis non-binding, the UK Prime Minister has made it clear that her government
intends to leave the EU. The relationship between the UK and the EU and thus
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Ireland is therefore likely to change. The timing and nature of the changes will
depend on the outcome of the Article 50 negotiations and the negotiations on the
future relationship between the UK and the EU which the EU will negotiate under
Article 218(3). 
The details of the agreement on the future relationship between the EU and the
UK that needs to be negotiated will determine the nature and scale of any economic
impacts that may arise. A number of different possible outcomes of the negotiation
process have been considered in previous research (e.g. Barrett et al., 2015; Ebel
and Warren, 2016). These range from a relatively benign scenario where the
agreement is similar to that between Norway and the EU, which would have more
limited impacts, to the more extreme scenario where trade between the EU and the
UK is conducted under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) tariff regime and
worker mobility between the EU and the UK is curtailed. 
The UK is the world’s fifth largest economy and the second largest in the EU
with imports from the EU and exports to the EU amounting to €400 billion and
€300 billion respectively in 2015.1 The scale of the UK economy and its strong
inter-linkages with the European and wider world economy suggest the impact of
any changes in these economic relationships could be substantial. While Ireland
has significantly diversified its economic relationships away from the UK over the
last forty years, the UK is still one of its most important individual trading partners
(see Barrett et al., 2015; Department of Finance, 2016). Furthermore, as Ireland is
the only country sharing a land border with the UK, and given the close cultural
ties that have enabled considerable movement of people between the UK and Ireland
over many decades, the impact of a changed relationship between the UK and the
EU is likely to affect the Irish economy, at least over the short- to medium-term.
The impact may arise through various economic channels and might affect trade,
financial flows, investment and the movement of labour.2 In fact, some studies have
suggested that Ireland would be hit more relative to other EU countries as a result
of Brexit (see, for example, Schoof et al., 2015). 
Previous research on the potential impacts of Brexit on Ireland has focused on
individual channels such as trade or FDI, or on sectors (e.g. Morgenroth, 2015;
Barrett et al., 2015; Ibec, 2016; Davy Research, 2016; Central Bank of Ireland,
2015; Donnellan and Hanrahan, 2016; Department of Finance, 2016). Barrett et al.
(2015) also estimated the impact of a 1 per cent reduction in the level of UK GDP
on the Irish economy but that analysis did not specify the nature of the shock to the
1 Data from the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) are converted into Euro using the annual average
exchange rate from the Central Bank of Ireland. 
2 The UK had also historically been successful in shaping the EU agenda and willing to take contrary
positions and its exit could change the diplomatic balance in future economic policy formation (see Morillas,
2016).
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UK economy and its wider implications on other trading partners.3 The result from
this generic simulation examining how sensitive Ireland is to the UK economy was
combined with estimated impacts of Brexit on the UK economy to provide an initial
assessment of the macroeconomic impact on Ireland due to a potential UK vote to
exit the EU (Department of Finance, 2016). This analysis suggested that there might
be a possible fall in Irish GDP relative to baseline in the range of 0.5 to 1.2 per cent
based on HM Treasury and UK National Institute of Economic and Social Research
(NIESR) estimates. Estimates also suggested that if Euro Area GDP were to also
fall by 1 per cent, a level estimated in the Treasury’s ‘severe scenario’, Irish GDP
would fall by a further 0.4 per cent relative to baseline. In the aftermath of the UK
referendum vote, the Central Bank of Ireland also published an estimate of the
impact of a UK exit of the EU on the Ireland economy, based on a Bayesian Vector
Autoregression approach (Central Bank, 2016). They considered an adverse WTO
scenario and their results suggest that the level of Irish GDP will be over 3 per cent
below a no-Brexit baseline after ten years. In the short term the CBI reduced their
forecasts for Irish GDP growth by 0.6 per cent in 2017, compared with a no-Brexit
baseline. 
The methodologies employed in these studies do not account for the combined
effect of all channels as well as feedback and indirect effects via other trading
partners, which means that they cannot assess the overall macroeconomic
consequences of Brexit. Such comprehensive macroeconomic impacts can only be
analysed using a full model of the Irish economy. This paper seeks to provide such
an analysis of the complete macroeconomic impact of Brexit on Ireland under three
alternative scenarios over the medium term. Specifically, the ESRI’s new
macroeconomic model, the COre Structural MOdel of the Irish Economy (COSMO,
see Bergin et al., 2016), is used to assess the macroeconomic impact under the three
scenarios developed by NIESR (Ebel and Warren, 2016; Ebel et al., 2016) to assess
the likely impact of Brexit on the UK. The NIESR modelling provides alternative
evolutions to a range of external variables under their Brexit scenarios which are
used in COSMO to model the effect on the Irish economy. This includes the impacts
on other countries due to Brexit, which is important as the analysis by NIESR and
others such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) shows that Brexit could have
substantial impacts on Ireland’s trading partners, which would impact on Ireland
in addition to the impact on the UK. The scenarios comprise an EEA arrangement
such as that between Norway and the EU, free merchandise trade only such as that
between Switzerland and the EU, and a WTO outcome. 
3 This type of simulation where UK GDP is exogenously shocked is very generic in nature; in reality, the
exact source and nature of a shock can be crucial for determining its impact on Ireland. Furthermore, this
simulation assumed that all other international variables that affect Ireland are unchanged relative to their
baseline values. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, the results of
previous modelling analysis of the impact of Brexit are briefly outlined. The section
focuses particularly on the impacts on the UK economy for which a number of
studies have been published. The section also briefly reviews the limited previous
analysis on the possible macroeconomic impacts of Brexit on Ireland. Section III
describes the modelling approach and provides estimates of the medium- to long-
term impact of Brexit on the Irish economy. Section IV concludes.
II PREVIOUS SCENARIO MODELLING OF THE IMPACT OF BREXIT 
Prior to the referendum, a number of UK and international agencies attempted to
model scenarios on the economic consequences of the UK voting to leave the EU.
These include the UK Treasury, the UK NIESR, the European Commission (EC),
OECD, IMF, The Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of
Economics (LSE-CEP), Oxford Economics, PwC and the Bertelsmann Foundation. 
A number of different modelling approaches were used, including macro-
econometric models (NIESR, HM Treasury, OECD, Oxford Economics), Bayesian
estimated models (IMF), CGE models (LSE/CEP, PwC), DSGE models (EC’s
Quest III model), and econometric trade models (Bertelsmann Foundation). In
particular, the NIESR NiGEM model was used by NIESR, HM Treasury and
OECD, and it is thus not surprising that the simulation results share many features
but they differ in terms of the assumptions around the nature of the Brexit impact. 
While some analysis only considered the short-term impacts of Brexit (e.g. HM
Treasury, 2016a; Baker et al., 2016a; Baker et al., 2016b), for example through
increased uncertainty and exchange rate fluctuations, most of the existing analysis
has focused on the medium- to long-term impacts, for example through reduced
trade, FDI, UK budget contribution to the EU, migration, and reduced productivity
due to lower trade and FDI.4
The modelling of the short-run impacts is inherently difficult, as the impacts
of Brexit in the short run largely arise out of uncertainty, which is difficult to
incorporate into models as unforeseen events can change the degree of uncertainty
and volatility. The impacts over the medium- to long-term are more readily assessed
in models as they arise out of real changes in the relationship between the UK and
the EU which can be quantified. However, there is still a lot of uncertainty about
what path the future relationship between the UK and the EU will take, especially
regarding trade, financial flows, and the movement of labour. 
4 The degree to which all of these factors are incorporated into model scenarios depends on the model and
scenario selected. For example, migration impacts are rarely considered while trade impacts are incorporated
in all model simulations. 
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To deal with this uncertainty about the nature of the eventual agreement
between the EU and the UK most studies consider a number of scenarios that cover
the range of possible outcomes to the Brexit process. In particular three scenarios
have been considered frequently. These scenarios are (i) a Norwegian-type solution
whereby the UK becomes a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), with
free trade and movement of workers; (ii) a scenario based on the UK agreeing a
bilateral trade agreement with the EU along the lines of the EU/Swiss trade
agreements, where trade in services is not free; and, (iii) a third scenario, whereby
the UK and EU do not conclude a bilateral trade agreement and instead, the UK
exercises its rights under the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO). In the light of statements by the UK Prime Minister
Theresa May and some ministers, the most likely scenario at this point is a relatively
hard Brexit where the UK leaves both the Single Market and the Customs Union,
and seeks to negotiate a bespoke trade deal. This implies a likely outcome that is
somewhere between the FTA scenario and the WTO scenario.
A further issue is that, at this point, it is difficult to predict the date at which
the UK will leave the EU, so that selecting a starting point for the changed
relationship between the EU and the UK for model simulations is difficult.5 While
the UK has triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon treaty at the time of writing, there
have been no substantive outcomes from the negotiations. These negotiations will
deal with a range of issues including liabilities and payments, and can only be
extended beyond a two-year period by unanimous agreement among EU Member
States.6 The relationship between the EU and the UK may be negotiated
simultaneously, but an agreement on this cannot be signed until the UK has
officially left the EU. This process is thus likely to take at least two years. In the
meantime the decision by the UK electorate has created significant uncertainty
about the future relationship between the EU and the UK, which has resulted in
significant market volatility. 
The results of the simulations of the impact of Brexit on UK GDP under
different scenarios is summarised in Table 1. Short-term impacts were estimated
by the Treasury (HM Treasury, 2016a), NIESR (Baker et al., 2016a; Baker et al.,
2016b), the OECD (Kierzenkowski et al., 2016), IMF (IMF, 2016) and the European
Commission (European Commission, 2016). The projected short-term impacts on
5 While Article 50 was triggered on 29 March 2017, which means that negotiations should be completed
and the UK will leave the EU on 29 March 2019, it is possible to extend the negotiations by unanimous
agreement and of course it is also possible that the UK might leave the EU before that date.
6 Under Article 50 a Member State needs to simply notify the European Council of its intent to leave the
EU. The EU treaties shall cease to apply to the Member State two years after the date of notification, unless
a different date is agreed to before that date by unanimous agreement. During the period between notification
and exit, the EU is required to negotiate and agree (by qualified majority and obtaining the consent of the
European Parliament) with the Member State the arrangements for its withdrawal.
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the level of UK GDP range from a contraction by 0.9 per cent relative to a no-Brexit
base, to a reduction of 3.6 per cent relative to base, with an average impact of 2.3
per cent. 
Table 1: Scenario Results by UK and International Institutions on the
Impacts of a Vote to Leave the EU on the UK 
Study Scenario GDP % Change 
Relative to Base 
NIESR WTO (short-term) –2.3
HM Treasury (short-term) –3.6 
OECD (short-term) –3.3 
IMF Downside (short-term) –0.9 
European Commission Mild (short-term) –1.0 
Severe (short-term) –2.7 




HM Treasury EEA –3.8 
FTA –6.2 
WTO –7.5 
OECD WTO/FTA (Optimistic) –2.7 
WTO/FTA (Central) –5.1 
WTO/FTA (Pessimistic) –7.7 
LSE/CEP EEA/FTA –7.9 
PwC FTA –3.0 
WTO –5.5 
Oxford Economics Liberal Customs Union –0.1 
FTA –2.8 
WTO –3.9 
Bertelsmann Foundation EEA –0.6 
WTO –3.0 
Long-run estimates of the impact of Brexit have been produced by HM Treasury
(HM Treasury, 2016b), NIESR (Ebell and Warren, 2016; Ebell et al., 2016), OECD
(Kierzenkowski et al., 2016), LSE/CEP (Ottaviano et al., 2014), Bertelsmann
Foundation (Schoof et al., 2015), Oxford Economics (2016) and PwC (2016). The
estimated long-run impacts range between –0.1 per cent and –7.9 per cent and
average –4.15 per cent relative to base. The wider range of projected impacts
compared to the short-run impacts is explained by the heterogeneity of the scenarios
and the longer time horizon. 
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As the model of the Irish economy used in the analysis of the impact of Brexit
on Ireland, COSMO, utilises projections of key external variables from the NIESR
NiGEM model, the model scenarios on Brexit produced by the NIESR can be
readily utilised in COSMO to model the impact of Brexit in Ireland. It is therefore
useful to consider the NIESR long-term projections of the impact of Brexit in more
detail. The scenarios in Ebell and Warren (2016) comprise an EEA style agreement,
a Switzerland/EU style of agreement (FTA) where merchandise trade would be free
but where EU financial services markets are not accessible to UK-based institutions,
and a WTO scenario.7 The magnitudes of the impacts on trade, FDI and tariffs are
derived by NIESR with reference to the international literature (see Ebel and
Warren, 2016), while the UK contribution to the EU budget is taken from HM
Treasury and the EU. Under the EEA, FTA and WTO scenarios, trade between the
UK and the EU is assumed to be reduced by 23 per cent, 31 per cent and 50 per
cent respectively. FDI inflows into the UK are also expected to be down by 9.7 per
cent, 17.1 per cent and 23.7 per cent respectively. The simulations also assume that
expenditure in the UK by the EU is replaced by direct expenditure from UK sources,
and the reduced or eliminated fiscal contribution to the EU budget would amount
to 0 per cent, 0.3 per cent and 0.3 per cent of UK GDP respectively. The results
show that depending on the scenario, the level of long-run UK GDP would be
reduced by between 1.8 per cent and 3.2 per cent and the level of wages would be
reduced by between 2.7 per cent and 5.5 per cent. 
III MODELLING THE IMPACT OF BREXIT ON IRELAND 
In order to gauge the potential impact of Brexit on Ireland, we consider a range of
alternative scenarios to cover the broad spectrum of possible outcomes. Specifically,
we use the three medium-to-long term counterfactual scenarios developed by
NIESR, described in the previous section, which we label ‘EEA’, ‘FTA’ and ‘WTO’
for convenience.8 Each of these scenarios combines a range of assumptions on trade,
FDI and lower contributions to the EU budget to generate alternative paths for the
UK economy and also for the wider international economy. The results from the
international scenarios are compared by NIESR to its counterfactual baseline, which
projects the path for the UK economy on the basis of it remaining in the EU. The
alternative international scenarios are used as an input for COSMO to estimate the
impact of Brexit on the Irish economy. 
7 They also report results for an additional WTO+ scenario where in addition to the WTO scenario the UK
economy is subject to a 5 per cent reduction in labour augmenting technical progress. 
8 We are very grateful to the team at NIESR for making the results of their detailed scenarios available to
us. 
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COSMO incorporates projections of key international variables from the
NiGEM model. These international variables include interest rates, effective
exchange rates, oil prices, competitor prices, trade-weighted world demand (for
Irish exports) and conditions in alternative labour markets. The three Brexit
scenarios developed by Ebell and Warren (2016) largely affect Ireland through the
trade channel. In COSMO, output in the traded sector is driven by world demand
and cost competitiveness and a 1 per cent increase in world demand for Irish exports
leads to GVA being around 1.3 per cent above base in the long term. This strong
impact reflects the highly open nature of the Irish economy. This is also the main
mechanism through which the Brexit scenarios operate in the COSMO model. This
also implies that the impacts estimated here do not encompass all channels through
which Brexit might affect Ireland. Separate analysis of the impact of a Brexit FDI
shock shows that this is expected to have a positive effect on Ireland but one that is
smaller than the negative trade effect (see Lawless and Morgenroth, 2016a).
The approach adopted is first to prepare a baseline scenario that describes the
evolution of the Irish economy were Brexit not to occur. To generate the baseline,
we use out-of-sample projections from COSMO out to 2030 (t+40 quarters in
Figure 1). However, experience has shown that the results obtained are relatively
invariant with respect to the precise baseline used. We also input the international
assumptions from a ‘no-Brexit’ scenario NIESR developed to create the baseline
scenario.9 Then the projections from these three alternative Brexit scenarios are
separately incorporated into COSMO. The resulting simulation results are then
compared to the baseline thereby isolating the effects on the Irish economy of
Brexit. Importantly, we do not impose any balanced budget rules/solvency rules in
order to identify the impact of Brexit on public finances. 
Figure 1 shows the medium- to long-term impact of Brexit on the level of real
output in the Irish economy over a horizon of ten years (40 quarters). In each
scenario, the level of Irish output is permanently below what it otherwise would
have been in the absence of Brexit. In these scenarios, we are abstracting from the
short-run uncertainties associated with Brexit and only considering the potential
medium- to longer-term impacts. For the simulations it is assumed that the starting
date in the scenarios can be viewed as the conclusion of the Article 50 negotiations.
The simulation results indicate that under the ‘EEA’ scenario, the level of Irish
9 An alternative approach to developing a baseline, which is sometimes adopted, is to forecast forward all
exogenous variables (including time) unchanged to generate the base. Then the changes are superimposed
on this artificial base. While this approach has the advantage that the results are not affected by changing
levels of key variables in the base, it raises difficulties as to how to handle inflation rates and rates of return,
including interest rates. Generally in such cases interest rates and rates of return should be held fixed in
real terms. Because of these problems we favour the baseline approach – superimposing shocks to the model
on a baseline forecast. In that regard, past experience in using the model indicates that the results of shocks
or perturbations are relatively invariant to small changes in the baseline.
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output will be around 2.3 per cent below what it otherwise would have been over
the longer term, while the longer term impacts are 2.7 per cent and 3.8 per cent in
the ‘FTA’ and ‘WTO’ scenarios respectively.10
The simulation results suggest that the potential long-term impact of Brexit on
Ireland is severe. While the three scenarios considered include a whole set of
international variables that are linked to COSMO, the strongest effect is a reduction
in the trade-weighted demand for Irish exports compared to what it otherwise would
have been.11 Table 2 shows the impact on key Irish macro variables after ten years
(40 quarters). The table shows the deviations of variables from their baseline values.
In each of the scenarios, the same mechanisms are at play but the impacts are
weakest for the ‘EEA’ scenario and strongest in the ‘WTO’ scenario. While there
is uncertainty around all of the estimated impacts, it is interesting to note that the
simulation results suggest that the overall macro impact on Ireland is slightly more
severe than the impact on the UK economy as reported by Ebell and Warren (2016),
reflecting the highly open nature of the Irish economy.
Figure 1: Impact on the Level of Real Output in Ireland Across the Three
Scenarios
10 The Central Bank of Ireland, using a Bayesian Vector Autoregression approach, considered the likely
long-term impact on real output in Ireland after ten years in a WTO scenario. Their estimates suggest that
the level of Irish output would be 3.2 per cent below a no-Brexit baseline.
11 The trade impacts are broadly similar to those obtained by Morgenroth (2015), Barrett et al. (2015) and 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2016b) using different methodologies to assess the potential trade impact of
Brexit. 
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In COSMO, this shock is initially transmitted to the Irish economy through the
traded sector. The shock to foreign demand would reduce the volume of output in
the traded sector and exports over the medium- to long-run to below their baseline
values. The fall in traded sector output leads to labour demand being below base
which has knock-on effects for employment and the unemployment rate. As a result
of the loosening in the labour market average wages are lower than in the base. The
combination of lower employment and lower wages leads to lower personal income
and consumption. As a result, activity in the non-traded sector which is driven by
domestic demand is below base. 
The fall in output and employment reduces government revenue from a range
of taxes while the increase in the unemployment rate would increase government
spending on welfare payments. The net effect is a dis-improvement in the general
government balance over the long term. 
Table 2: Impact of Brexit on Ireland after ten years, change from baseline 
EEA FTA WTO 
Per cent deviation from Baseline Level:
Gross value added at basic prices –2.3 –2.7 –3.8 
Gross value added at basic prices, traded sector –2.6 –3.0 –4.3 
Gross value added at basic prices, non-traded sector –2.3 –2.7 –3.6 
Exports of goods and services –3.0 –3.5 –4.9 
Personal consumption of goods and services –2.2 –2.5 –3.4 
Employed persons –1.2 –1.4 –2.0 
Average wage € –2.2 –2.5 –3.6 
Deviation from Baseline:
Personal consumption deflator, % –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 
GDP deflator, % –0.2 –0.2 –0.3
Personal savings rate, % –0.3 –0.3 –0.5 
Unemployment rate, % 1.2 1.4 1.9 
General government balance, % GDP –0.6 –0.8 –1.0  
IV CONCLUSIONS
There is almost a complete consensus in the existing literature that Brexit will have
a negative effect on the UK economy both in the short-term (via uncertainty) and
over the medium-to-long term (via trade, FDI etc.). The UK is one of Ireland’s
closest economic partners and, as such, Ireland will be very exposed to the effects
of the UK leaving the EU. There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the
Modelling the Potential Macroeconomic Impact of Brexit on Ireland 315
eventual agreement between the UK and the EU. As a result, many of the existing
international papers that model the effects of Brexit consider several scenarios that
cover the range of potential outcomes. 
To model the potential effects of Brexit on the Irish economy, we draw on the
international literature and use the scenarios developed by NIESR to create
alternative international scenarios for Ireland. These international scenarios are
incorporated into the new COSMO model of the Irish economy in order to quantify
the potential impact of Brexit. The results of the modelling exercise confirm some
international analysis (e.g. Schoof et al., 2015) that Ireland will be particularly badly
impacted by Brexit. Depending on the scenario considered, the level of Irish output
ranges to between 2.3 and 3.8 per cent below what it otherwise would have been. 
Given that COSMO is a three sector model where all internationally traded
activities are aggregated into one sector, the analysis does not shed light on the
sectoral exposures or indeed the regional exposures and distributional
consequences. Clearly the impact of Brexit is unlikely to be evenly distributed
across sectors, regions and the population. To investigate these aspects
microeconomic approaches need to be utilised. Lawless and Morgenroth (2016b)
analyse the potential impact of the imposition of WTO tariffs, which corresponds
with the more severe scenario in this paper, on trade at the detailed product level.
They show that agri-food products in particular are highly vulnerable to a hard
Brexit. 
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